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The Plaintiff in Default
Richard H. Lee*
I. INTRODUCTION

This article is concerned with one basic fact pattern. A party to a
contract has commenced performance but has stopped short of completion. His failure to perform further is legally inexcusable. The

other party has not performed, but is not in default. Can the one
in default salvage anything from the wreckage of the contract when

he himself "cast it on the rocks"? Can he recover the value of his
part performance despite the fact that he refused to abide by his

contract? The answer most commonly given by the courts is a
righteous no.' But there are many factors which should, and some-

times do, enter into a determination of the question. We shall consider some of them here.

For a brief period in the early part of the last decade it looked as
though there might be a dramatic reversal of the old rule denying the

defaulting party relief. Judge Clark's decision in Amtorg Trading
Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co.2 prophesied a change in

the New York law; and the New York legislature adopted legislation allowing a measure of restitution to the defaulting purchaser
of goods.3 Freedmanv. The Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen4 indicated

that California had abandoned its previous position and favored
restitution. Maryland law purported to protect some defaulting pur-

chasers of both land 6 and goods7 from unjust forfeiture. The Uniform
Commercial Code, then a matter of widespread speculation, recog-

nized rights in the defaulting purchaser.8

* Professor of Law, University of Miami. B.A., Rollins College; L.L.B., Columbia;
L.L.M., J.S.D., New York University; Member, New York and Florida Bars.
1. E.g., Hansbrough v. Peck, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 497 (1866); Tovrea v. Alderman, 211
F. Supp. 865 (D. Ore. 1962); Varner v. Hardy, 209 Ala. 575, 96 So. 860 (1923); Melton v. Amar, 86 Idaho 262, 385 P.2d 406 (1963); Henry v. Rouse, 345 Mich. 86, 75
N.W.2d 836 (1956); Notti v. Clark, 133 Mont. 263, 322 P.2d 112 (1958); Lawrence v.
Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881); Fokine v. Shubert, 210 App. Div. 468, 206 N.Y.S. 311
(1924); Medak v. DePrez, 236 Ore. 31, 386 P.2d 805 (1963); Strand v. Mayne, 14
Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963).
2. 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953).
3. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1952, ch. 823, § 1, repealed N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102 [hereinafter
referred to as N.Y. PEns. PRop. LAw § 145-a].
4. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
5. See, e.g., Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898).
6. Md. Acts 1951, ch. 596, §§ 117-23.
7. Md. Acts 1941, ch. 851, § 116.
8. UzwORm ComEmcrAL CODE § 2-718.
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But the New York courts quickly rejected Amtorg's "tempting hint."
New York's legislation has had little impact on judicial attitudes. 10
Despite Freedman, forfeiture may still occur in California." Maryland still follows the old rule in cases which do not come specifically
within her statutes. 2 And the Uniform Commercial3 Code provision
allowing restitution is at best an unknown remedy.
Does this mean that the old rule purporting to forfeit the value of
the defaulter's performance regardless of the inequity is still the law
in the majority of jurisdictions? It is doubtful. In fact, it is doubtful
if the rule was ever so broad in practice as the statement of it would
indicate. There have been harsh decisions under the general rule. 4
But even in the strictest jurisdictions equity has managed to play a
5
part.'
The judicial attitude that there can be no recovery by a plaintiff
in default stems in large part from an unwillingness or an inability
to distinguish quasi-contract from actual contract, from a confusion
of restitution with damages for breach. Concededly, in actions for
damages for breach of contract, where the promises of the defendant
are dependent upon performance by the plaintiff, no relief is available
to a plaintiff who has not performed. 6 He is not entitled to damages
because the defendant has done him no wrong. But if the plaintiff
has partly performed, if he has conferred something of value upon
the defendant pursuant to the contract, even though his part performance is not sufficient to entitle him to demand any performance by
the defendant, may he not recover the value of his part performance
less the damage caused by his breach? This is restitution. The
reluctance of courts to allow it arises from a feeling that to do so
17
would somehow permit "a party an advantage from his own wrong."
9. Pearson Int'l, Inc. v. Congeladora de Mazattan, 141 N.Y.S.2d 221, 226 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
10. No case has been found where N.Y. Personal Property Law § 145-a was decisive.
See Zuback v. Moskowitz Floor Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 245, 176 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct.
1958); Lichtman v. I.P.M. Indus., Inc., 158 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1956), where
restitution was denied without citing § 145-a long after its enactment.
11. Lines v. Main Municipal Water Dist., 228 Cal. App. 2d 60, 39 Cal. Rptr. 294
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
12. Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, 140 A.2d 517 (1958).
13. Even in Pennsylvania where the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718(2) has
been in effect longer than anywhere else, no cases have been found where it has been
cited.
14. Bisner v. Mantell, 197 Misc. 807, 95 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1950).
15. MacMurray v. City of Long Beach, 292 N.Y. 286, 54 N.E.2d 828 (1944); Develop
Realty Corp. v. United Engineering Trustees, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 849, 226 N.Y.S.2d 801
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
16. RF-sTATEMFNT, CoNTRAcTs § 269 (1932).
17. Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 267, 275 (1824).
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The courts cannot deny the plaintiffs power to breach his contract, but
restitution appears to concede him a right to do so, and this goes
against the grain.
Unquestionably where the contract provides that the plaintiff's
performance be completed first, he trusts the other party to perform.
And, under our basic fact pattern, that trust has not been demonstrably breached. But did the plaintiff's trust encompass a forfeiture
of his partial performance in the event of his default? Sometimes
the contract so provides, and if both parties bargained in reference
to such a result, as, for instance, in an attorney's contingent fee contract, a forfeiture of the plaintiff's effort, if it falls short of total
performance, may appear just.'8 But where the contract does not
provide for forfeiture, and even in many instances where it does,
forfeiture may be most unjust. The general rule denies all recovery
to a plaintiff in default despite the fact that the more nearly his
performance approaches completion the greater will be the forfeiture.
Is his trust to be his undoing? Here the actions of the courts belie their
harsh statement of the general rule. In some instances the courts find
the plaintiff's default to be so slight that it can be said that he has
substantially performed. In these cases, he can be allowed a recovery
on the contract because the defendant's refusal to perform is not
excusable. 19 In other cases, the nature of the contract is such that it
can be divided into a series of mutually dependent promises, and to
the extent that his total performance encompasses one or more of
these segments he can be allowed recovery on the contract pro tanto.'
Finally, if neither of the above circumstances is present, he may
still be able to recover a portion of his performance, or its equivalent,
21
if its net effect was to unjustly enrich the defendant.
The first two of these ameliorating subterfuges are actions upon
the contract, in affirmance of it and in reliance upon it. They are
achieved by finding either that the plaintiff's default is not a breach
at all, as in the case of substantial performance, or that despite his
breach of the overall contract he is not in default as to some of the
parts. But the third remedy is restitution. It is not dependent upon
the contract. It is equitable in nature and concerned with preventing
unjust benefit to the defendant rather than with compensating the
18. Setzer v. All Steel Engines, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 2d 706, 338 P.2d 18 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Mormilo v. Allied Stevedores Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 217; 186 N.Y.S.2d 744
(1st Dep't 1959); In re Polansky, 33 Misc. 2d 292, 223 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Dist. Ct. 1962);
Holcomb v. Steele, 47 Tenn. App. 704, 342 S.W.2d 236 (1958).
19. Lawrence v. Cunningham, 160 Me. 89, 197 A.2d 767 (1964); Julian v. Kiefer,
382 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
20. Joachim v. Andover Silver Co., 104 N.H. 18, 177 A.2d 394 (1962).
21. De Leon v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Bryant v. Pennington, 346 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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19

plaintiff for his loss. Performance of implied conditions here is
irrelevant.
One of the merits of a general rule is that it gives at least an
illusion of certainty. But the more general the rule, the more inaccurate it may be when its literal application leads to injustice. It may
linger on unchanged in form, but become so diluted in practice that
it defeats its original purpose and causes uncertainty. So it is with the
general rule denying recovery to the defaulting plaintiff. Restitution
has achieved substantial justice in most cases but with a corresponding
loss of predictability. And in those areas where the contract functions
as a security device akin to a mortgage, a loss of predictable certainty
may also mean a loss of equity. At least it is an invitation to litigation.
Perhaps one reason for the firm statement of the majority rule by so
many courts in land contract cases is that they believe it is desirable
to support the reasonable expectations of vendors who have used a
retained title as a security device. The installment land contract is
widely used instead of a mortgage in the belief that it is a less costly
and more efficient way of securing the payment of the purchase
price.22 The basis of this belief is the existence of the vendor's right
to retake the property and forfeit the purchaser's payments. To
recognize a right to restitution in the defaulting purchaser is to
attack the very reason for using the installment contract. The vendor
might just as well have used a mortgage if he is compelled to foreclose
a right of restitution.23 Once restitution is recognized there is no sure
way a vendor can clear himself of a claim by a purchaser short of an
equitable foreclosure. If a simpler alternative foreclosure procedure
were available, perhaps many courts would be more willing to
acknowledge openly the right to restitution.2 4
We shall consider first the rights of a plaintiff in default under a
service contract, then under a contract for the sale of personal
property, and finally under a contract for the sale of real property. In
all of these situations, the chance of a recovery may be affected by a
variety of factors. The following questions raise some of these factors
and may be helpful in analyzing a particular case. They are, of
course, not applicable to all situations.
1. What kind of contract is involved? Is the agreement a security
arrangement such as a retained title contract designed to secure
payment of a sum of money? If so, is there a need for predictable
22. See Dolson & Zile, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts, 1960 Wis. L.
REv. 383.

23. See Hetland, Land Contracts, in CAoLFRNiA LAND SEcUarr AND DEVrLOPmNT
§ 2.20 (1960).
24. See Lee, Defaulting Purchaser'sRight to Restitution under the Installment Land
Contract, 20 U. MIaI L. REv. 1, 21 (1965).
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certainty which may override the equities to some degree?
2. Does the defendant's retention of the benefit conferred by the
defaulting plaintiff result in an unjust enrichment of the defendant, or
do the damages caused by the plaintiffs breach approximate the
benefit retained?
3. Is the benefit sought to be recovered a payment of earnest
money?
4. Is the contract severable? Or is it an entire contract which calls
for no recovery for less than full performance? Is it possible that the
contract is merely masquerading as an entire contract to justify an
otherwise unconscionable forfeiture?
5. What is the social setting of the contract? Are the parties equal
in bargaining power? Was the contract induced by misleading advertising or compelled by high pressure salesmanship?
6. What are the contract provisions? Does it make time of the
essence? Does it provide for forfeiture? Does it contain a liquidated
damages clause? Is this clause bona fide or is it in truth a penalty?
7. What is the attitude of the defaulting party? Is he "willful" in
his default? And what is meant by "willful"?
8. What is the attitude of the party not in default? Is he pressing
for performance? Has he disabled himself from performing? Has
he rescinded or accepted the plaintiff's offer to rescind?
9. How serious is the breach?
10. Is the nature of the benefit conferred such that it can be
easily returned and thus its retention deemed an acceptance with
knowledge of the breach?
11. Is the court able to distinguish between damages for breach
and restitution?
12. What is the effect of legislation on the decision? 25
II. SERVICE CojNraTc-rs

Included under this heading are contracts involving professional
services, such as those of attorneys and architects, building contractors,
salesmen, and promoters, in short, any contract where the primary
performance of the plaintiff involves skill or labor rather than the
sale of some form of property.
Two basic principles are in conflict in the decisions. Each is
exemplified by a leading case whose holding is now largely of antiquarian interest but whose philosophy continues to support one or the
other of these principles. In both cases, laborers who had breached
25. Consider for instance: UmFolm SALES ACT § 44; Urxwoat CoNDrrnoNAL SALES
ACT §§ 16-26; UNIwoRM COMMERcrAL CODE § 2-718(2); N.Y. PEas. PRop. LAw §
145-a.
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their contracts of employment sued to recover the value of their
services rendered prior to the breach. As might be expected, one
was allowed recovery; the other was not. These facts are not likely
to be seen again, as each case involved a plaintiff who had
agreed to work an entire year for a total payment of 120 dollars,
and, at the time of breach, in one case no payment at all had been
made by the employer and in the other a substantial part of the
payment was still unpaid. Today laborers are not so easily found and
few will trust an employer for so long a time. Furthermore, wage
statutes in many states now compel periodic payments to wage earners
thus eliminating the possibility of long deferred payment for personal
services. 26
Stark v. Parker27 rested its denial of recovery to the defaulting
plaintiff upon the doctrine of implied conditions, holding it repugnant
to the dictates of moral sense, that a party who deliberately and under-

standingly enters into an engagement and voluntarily breaks it, should be
permitted to make that very engagement the foundation of a claim to

compensation for services under it. The true ground . .. is, that the party
claiming has done all which on his part was to be performed by the terms
28
of the contract, to entitle him to enforce the obligation of the other party.

In Stark, sanctity of contract won out over unjust enrichment. Although the issue of unjust enrichment was clearly raised, the court
was unable to distinguish quasi contract from actual contract. The
trial court had instructed the jury to take into account any damage
caused to the employer by the plaintiff's breach and to award only
the excess of the benefit conferred over such damage. But this instruction was held error. The effect of this decision is to punish the
defaulting party out of all proportion to the injury he has caused.
It is punitive to the plaintiff and a windfall to the defendant, but it
is still the law in Massachusetts and, according to most authorities,
represents the majority view in the United States. 29 Adding up the
factors which might justify such a result, we find first, that the plaintiff breached his contract "without excuse." However, he undoubtedly
had an excuse; it was just not acceptable to the court. And whatever
the plaintiff's reasons were for not performing, they should not have
rendered him an outlaw. This is a typical example of "willful"
26. E.g., Asa.
STAT. REv.

81-301 (1947) (semi-monthly payments); CONN. GEN.
(weekly payments); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, §§ 148-

STAT. ANN.

31-71 (1961)

159B (1965) (weekly payments).
27. 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 267 (1824).
28. Id. at 271.

29. See Patterson, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract, 1942 N.Y. LAw REvisioN COMM'N REP. 195, 210; WADE, CASES ON RESTUTtnON
695 n.1 (2d ed. 1966). But see 5A Coanpm, CoNTAcrs § 1127 (1964).
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breach. 30 Second, the contract was an entire rather than a severable
one. Apparently however, the employer had made some payments so
it might be argued that the parties did not intend the plaintiff to
work the full period before being paid. Also, the term of the contract
was for such a long period, one year, that the implication would seem
to favor periodic payment for periodic services. 31 Third, personal
services are not the sort of benefit that can be returned by a defendant
and hence he should not have to pay for them. But such an argument
works both ways. The defendant knew when he received the benefits
that they were incapable of specific return and might be presumed
to have consented to pay something for them. And fourth, undoubtedly the breach caused some damage to the employer. But the jury
took this fact into account in finding for the plaintiff in the trial court.
When one considers the inequality of bargaining power between the
parties and the harshness of the result, it is hard to justify Stark v.
Parker let alone prolong its life for over a hundred years. Although
it may have served some social purpose in 1824, the case would seem
deserving of retirement in the twentieth century.
Britton v. Turnei is the leading case representing the other line
of authority. On facts almost identical to those in Stark, it allowed a
defaulting laborer to recover in quasi contract for services rendered
before his breach. Although one might question the court's effort to
find a consideration to support the quasi contract, the arguments
used to sustain the result have a thoroughly modern ring. In place of
the moral indignation of Stark, the New Hampshire court supported
its position with practical reasoning. It recognized that the effect of
the majority rule is to penalize the party in default in inverse proportion to the seriousness of the breach. It clearly saw that to forfeit the
plaintiff's performance was to unjustly enrich the defendant. Although
aware that the nature of the plaintiff's services were such that the
defendant could not return them, the court found that the defendant
"assented" to receive them and thus must compensate. And the court
anticipated the wage statutes by asserting that the general understanding in laborers' contracts was that workmen were to be paid for work
performed regardless of the terms of the contract. The contract price
was used to determine the quasi contractual recovery, resulting in
pro rata compensation, but the court realized that this was merely a
means of finding the reasonable worth of the labor performed.When one examines the more recent cases, it appears that even
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See generally 5A ComBIN, CONTRACTS § 1123.
See Osgood v. Paragon Silk Co., 19 Misc. 186, 43 N.Y. Supp. 271 (Sup. Ct. 1897).
6 N.H. 481 (1834).
Id. at 492.
Id. at 495.
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though the greater number of total decisions seem to favor the reasoning of Stark v. Parker, the trend is otherwise.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has relied upon Stark
in two
fairly recent cases. In Jackson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
35
Co., the plaintiff performed personal services for her employer for

a period of nearly thirty years in reliance upon his promise to leave her
his property in his will. When he died without doing so she brought
suit for the value of the services rendered. The court conceded that
the plaintiff would be entitled to a quantum meruit recovery provided
she was not in default. The testimony indicated that the employer,
a few years before his death, asked the plaintiff to stop coming to
his home and thus stop her work because she did not get along with
a woman friend of the employer who was living in his house. The
plaintiff acquiesced. The court relied upon Stark v. Parkerto deny her
a recovery, holding that, whatever her motives may have been for
ceasing employment, she was in default. This is a bad result. The
plaintiff was not a volunteer. She gave up a substantial part of her
life to the employer's service. Her breach, if such it was, was excusable
and in fact was induced by the employer.
The result in Le Bel v. McCoy,3 another Massachusetts case, seems
fairer, but is still based upon Stark v. Parkers strict requirement of
performance of implied conditions. The plaintiff, a building contractor, agreed to build a house for the defendants for a total sum of
7,600 dollars. No time for payment was fixed. The defendants obtained a construction mortgage providing for periodic payments to
them, and the plaintiff and defendant subsequently agreed that payments were to be made to the plaintiff whenever the defendants
received them from the bank. After making two payments totalling
3,800 dollars the defendants arbitrarily refused to make the third
payment of 1,520 dollars. Their refusal was not based upon any
complaint with the plaintiffs work. The defendants insisted that the
plaintiff complete the house without further payment. The plaintiff
stopped work and brought suit for the value of the labor performed
over and above the payments already received. Despite the auditor's
finding that the agreement to make periodic payments was merely a
clarification of the original contract, the court held the agreement to
be without consideration and therefore unenforceable. The decision
was for the defendants upon the ground that the plaintiff was in
default. His default, however, was not his refusal to perform without
further payment, but rather that he had installed a wooden beam in
place of the steel one called for by the plans. This substitution was
35. 310 Mass. 593, 39 N.E.2d 85 (1942).
36. 314 Mass. 206,49 N.E.2d 888 (1943).
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apparently not even known to the defendants when they stopped
payment and the auditor found that the plaintiff had performed his
work in a good and workmanlike manner despite the substitution.
If the result does not seem as harsh as Jackson it is only because the
plaintiff, a businessman, was not so appealing a subject for equitable
relief. Still the work which he did was of substantial value. Since the
contract left open the time of payment, payment logically should have
been made according to general custom. This would have justified the
contractor's refusal to continue performance, but because of his substitution of beams, it still would not have entitled him to a recovery.
The net result of this case is that the defendants received a substantial
benefit for which they did not have to pay and the contractor paid a
penalty that bore no relationship to his default.
Similarly, a very recent federal case, Green Manor Construction Co.
v. Highland Painting Service, 7 denied a defaulting subcontractor recovery in quantum meruit as well as on the contract. But the reasoning does not support the majority rule. Highland, the defaulting
plaintiff, satisfied the master and the trial court that it was entitled
to a recovery, but on appeal, the judgment was reversed with the
suggestion that the defendant should prevail on its counterclaim.
Highland was held to be in substantial default and thus not to come
within the rule allowing recovery for substantial performance. No
affirmative relief in quantum meruit was allowed, but indirectly relief
was given since Highland was awarded credit against the amount of
defendant's counterclaim for all work and supplies actually furnished
up to the time of total breach. This case, although not citing Britton,
is more consistent with its reasoning than with that of the so-called
majority position.
Corti v. Continental Copper and Steel Export Co.,38 another recent
federal case, denied a promoter recovery even though he went to a
great deal of trouble and expense to negotiate, on the defendant's
behalf, a contract for the construction and operation of factories in
Italy. But the action was on the contract, not in quantum meruit. The
plaintiff failed to interest an Italian group whose participation was
essential to the deal and the court held this to be a condition precedent
to any liability of the defendant. The understanding of the parties was
that this was an all-or-nothing arrangement, and the reward for
success was sufficiently large to justify placing the risk of failure to
achieve total performance on the plaintiff. Another justification of
the result is that even though it may be said that the defendant had
the advantage of plaintiff's services, these services produced no ultimate benefit to the defendant.
37. 345 F.2d 657 (1st Cir. 1965).
38. 223 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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If the promoter's contract in Corti can be considered an all-ornothing agreement, then surely an attorney's contingent fee contract
should be similarly categorized. Yet in Moore v. Fellner,39 the California Supreme Court allowed a quantum meruit recovery to an
attorney in default under a contingent fee contract. Moore, the attorney-plaintiff, entered into a contract with Fellner which provided
that Moore was to prosecute one law suit and defend another and
was to be paid solely from the recovery in the former. The contract
expressly called upon Moore to handle any appeals at the option of
Fellner. Moore was successful in obtaining a judgment of 104,500
dollars in the first suit and arranged a settlement of the second. But
when the defendant in the first suit appealed, Moore demanded 2,000
dollars additional fee to handle the appeal. This was a breach of his
contract and Felner treated it as such, relieving Moore of control
of the case and retaining another attorney to represent him on the
appeal for a fee of 1,000 dollars. The new lawyer was successful on
the appeal and the judgment obtained by Moore was affirmed. Upon
Fellner's refusal to pay Moore anything, Moore brought suit in
quantum meruit. The district court of appeal reversed a judgment
in Moore's favor on the ground that he was in default.40 This, in turn
was reversed by the supreme court, which recognized that Moore was
in default, but treated the contract as divisible and thus distinguished
this case from those cases holding a contingent fee contract to be
entire.41 The case was remanded to determine the value of Moore's
services. This certainly was not a typical severable contract, however,
where specific payment could be allocated to the severable portions.42
Moore contracted for the whole job. His fee was sufficiently large to
indicate that he assumed the risk of loss of his time and effort if he
failed to perform. True, he had completed a substantial part of his
agreement and undoubtedly his effort was the greatest single factor in
the favorable result which Fellner obtained. The allowance of
restitution may be partly explained by the supreme court's inference
that Moore's breach was the result of a misunderstanding on his
part. It is true that Moore's breach was so obvious and so dangerous
that some sort of explanation seems called for. But was it for the court
to make? If ever there was a justification for the philosophy of Stark
v. Parker, the facts of Moore should have invoked it. Nonetheless,
despite the dissent of Justice Traynor, the result seems sound. To
39. 50 Cal. 2d 330, 325 P.2d 857 (1958).
40. Moore v. Fellner, 318 P.2d 526 (Cal. App. 1957).
41. See Cahill v. Baird, 70 Pac. 1061 (Cal. 1902) and cases cited supra note 18.
42. Compare Joachim v. Andover Silver Co., supra note 20. Moore v. Feliner seems
more analogous to those cases allowing recovery on the basis of the substantial performance.
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deny Moore relief would be to punish his breach out of all proportion
to the damage caused by it and to unjustly enrich the defendant.
The doctrine of substantial performance continues to be widely
used to allow recovery by a building contractor despite his failure to
perform his contract in all particulars. But its application is generally
limited to those cases where the breach is comparatively minor. 43 In
Odgers v. Held, however, the Washington Supreme Court allowed a
recovery on the contract to a builder who was substantially in default,
awarding him full credit for his costs and his fee but offsetting this
recovery with the sums the defendant owner had paid together with
the difference between the value of the house contracted for and that
delivered. The court rejected the usual rule in substantial performance
cases, which allows the contractor recovery of the contract price less
the cost of completing the structure according to the contract, on the
ground that to complete the work as specified in the contract "would
involve unreasonable economic waste."
It would seem more reasonable, where the contractor is substantially
in default, to limit his recovery to restitution of the benefit conferred
on the owner not exceeding the contract price. This was done in
Kirkland v. Archbold,45 a case in which the Court of Appeals of
Ohio rejected its earlier position that a defaulting plaintiff can have
no recovery unless he has substantially performed, and expressly
adopted the view of Britton v. Turner. So also, in Broadway Roofing
& Supply Inc. v. Covello,47 the Colorado Supreme Court denied
rescission to the homeowner and allowed the contractor, who was
substantially in default, recovery on his counterclaim for the value of
the work completed. And in Power-Matics, Inc. v. Ligotti,8 a New
Jersey court, although finding the contractor in "willful default," nonetheless indicated that it would allow him a quasi contractual recovery
to the extent of the benefit conferred. Furthermore, in Burke v.
McKee,49 the Oklahoma Supreme Court, citing Britton v. Turner,
awarded a quasi contractual recovery to a plaintiff substantially in
default under an entire contract to level trees and clear land belonging to the defendant. And in San Augustine Independent School Districtv. Freelove,50 a Texas court allowed a defaulting architect the reasonable value of his services, also citing Britton.
43. See Lawrence v. Cunningham, supra note 19; Julian v. Kiefer, supra note 19;
Mathis v. Thunderbird Village Inc., 236 Ore. 425, 389 P.2d 343 (1964).
44. 58 Wash. 2d 247, 362 P.2d 261 (1961).
45. 68 Ohio L. Abs. 481; 113 N.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1953).
46. Larkin v. Buck, 11 Ohio St. 561 (1860).
47. 144 Colo. 562, 357 P.2d 356 (1960).
48. 79 N.J. Super. 294, 191 A.2d 483 (Super. Ct. 1963).
49. 304 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1956).
50. 195 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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In comparing the modem cases it appears that, whatever may be
the numerical weight of authority, the doctrine of Britton v. Turner
has prevailed in most jurisdictions which have had recent occasion to
review the problem of the plaintiff in default under a contract for
services.
III. PLAINTIFF IN DEFAULT UNDER A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF GOODS
The plaintiff in default under a contract of sale, whether the subject
matter be goods or land, is usually the purchaser. And again, regard-

less of the subject matter, the decided weight of authority denies
him recovery. 51 The courts make no particular distinction between
real estate contracts and contracts for the sale of goods, frequently
citing the former as authority for denying relief in the latter. For
instance, Lawrence v. Miller,52 the leading New York case denying
restitution, involved a land contract, but it is cited regularly in sales
cases. 53 Legislation, however, has made a distinction between sales of
goods contracts and contracts for the sale of land; the Uniform Sales
Act,- the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,55 and the Uniform Commercial Code5 6 all purport to deal only with the former. Therefore, it
seems appropriate to treat these two types of sales contracts separately
in the following discussion.
Under a land contract the purchaser is usually the only party in
need of restitution because vendors of land rarely transfer both possession and legal title until they have been paid in full or until the
purchase price has been secured by a mortgage. In sales of personal
property, section 44 of the Uniform Sales Act permits a seller, who
has failed to deliver all that he contracted to deliver, to recover the
contract price for the part delivered if the buyer knew when he
received the goods that the seller was not going to perform fully;
and if the buyer has used or disposed of the goods before he knows of
the seller's breach, then the seller is allowed to recover the value
of the goods from the buyer. In other words, the defaulting seller of
goods has, by statute, a remedy either in contract or in quasi contract
depending upon the buyer's knowledge of the breach.
Section 44 of the Sales Act embodied the common law rule, followed
in the majority of jurisdictions, allowing a defaulting seller recovery
51. 5A CoBIN, CoNTRACrs § 1129.

52. 86 N.Y. 131 (1881).
53. E.g., Kovacich v. Metals Bank & Trust Co., 139 Mont. 449, 365 P.2d 639 (1961);
Waldman v. Greenberg, 265 App. Div. 827, 37 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1942); Miller
v. Ellswere Caterers, Inc., 211 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Munic. Ct. Bronx 1961); Dwares v.
Clifton Yarn Mills, Inc., 65 R.I. 471, 16 A.2d 501 (1940).
54. UNNionm SALEs ACT § 44.
55. UNwoORM CONDnONAL SALES AcT §§ 16-26.
56. UNIFORiM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718.
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for his partial performance. 57 But neither the weight of authority
at common law nor the Sales Act offered the defaulting buyer a
corresponding right to restitution of payments made prior to his
default.5 8 In an effort to give the defaulting buyer rights similar to
those accorded the seller, the New York Law Revision Commission
in 1942 and again in 1952 proposed and eventually prompted the
enactment of section 145-a of the New York Personal Property Law.59
This statute entitled the buyer in default to restitution of payments
made in excess of the sum set forth in a valid liquidated damage
clause, or if the contract had no such clause, then of payments made
in excess of twenty per cent of the value of his total performance.
Any recovery was subject to offset by the actual damage caused by
the buyer's breach, provided there was no liquidated damage clause,
and by the value of any benefit received by the buyer under the
contract. Section 145-a became effective September 1, 1952, and
expressly provided that it should not be applied retroactively.
Where a sales contract provides for delivery of goods to the buyer
and, until the purchase price is paid, retention of title by the seller, it
is within the terms of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. This act
recognizes the security nature of the retained title and provides, to
some extent, a right of redemption to the buyer and an equitable
process for foreclosing this right.60
Today these statutes are being repealed and replaced by the
Uniform Commercial Code, which has already been adopted by 6a1
number of states previously without statutory law on the subject.
The Commercial Code deals specifically with the defaulting buyer's
right to restitution in section 2-718(2). Under this section the purchaser in default can have restitution of his payments in excess of a
valid liquidated damage amount, or, if there is no such amount set
forth in the contract, in excess of twenty per cent of the value of his
total performance or 500 dollars, whichever is smaller. An offset of
damages caused by the plaintiff's breach and of any benefits received
by him under the contract is provided for. This obviously is similar
to New York Personal Property Law section 145-a except that the
twenty per cent statutory liquidated damage is limited to 500
dollars.
Perhaps the most interesting thing about these statutes is the
infrequency with which the courts have made use of them. One
57. 5 WMILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1474 (rev. ed. 1937).

58. Patterson, supra note 29, at 233.
59. See 1942 N.Y. LAw REvISIoN ComM'N REP., 179-243; 1952 N.Y. LAw REvISION
Comah'N RE:P. 83-101.
60. U wom m CoNRiT oNAL SALEs ACT §§ 16-26.
61. See FLA. STAT. §§ 671-80 (1965), which takes effect Jan. 1, 1967.
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might have expected that legislative recognition of a right to restitution in a defaulting buyer would have resulted in similar judicial
recognition, and even that the legislative policy might have been
extended beyond the letter of the statute and caused the courts to
allow restitution in similar cases not expressly covered by the acts.
But such has not been the result.
62
In Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co.,63

Judge Clark, responsive to the mandate of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
sought to determine the then current New York attitude towards a
purchaser in default. The public policy embodied in section 145-a
and in the New York Law Revision Commission Reports6 seemed to
him indicative of a more lenient attitude towards restitution and
helped sustain his decision for the defaulting plaintiff.65 However, in
Pearson International, Inc. v. Congeladora De Mazatlan,6 a New
York Supreme Court case, Justice Saypol rejected Judge Clark's
"tempting hint"67 and reaffirmed the New York position embodied in
Lawrence v. Miller,68 denying any relief to a plaintiff in default. The
court suggested that section 145-a
"might furnish ground for relief
69
here but for its effective date."

In cases arising since the effective date of section 145-a, the lower
courts of New York have tended to ignore the statute.7 0 Even where
the defendant can no longer perform, the plaintiff in default cannot
71
recover his down payment. In Miller v. Ellsmere Caterers, Inc.,

the plaintiff paid 100 dollars down on a catered party to celebrate the
confirmation of the plaintiff's son. The total price was 1,095 dollars
and thus the twenty per cent statutory liquidated damage of section
145-a was not exceeded. But subsequent to the plaintiff's breach of
the contract the defendant's kitchen burned down and thus performance was an impossibility. Nonetheless, the Bronx municipal court
62. 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953).
63. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
64. Acts, Recommendation and Study Relating to Recovery for Benefits Conferred by
Party in Default, 1942 N.Y. LAw RE ViON COMM'N REP. 179-243; Act, Recommenda-

tion and Study Relating to the Right of a Buyer of Goods to Restitution for Benefits
Conferred Under a Contract of Sale on Which He Has Defaulted, N.Y. LAw REViSION
COma'N, 1952 N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 65 (c), 1-19.
65. The decision actually rests upon the overriding national policy embodied in Export Control regulations of the Foreign Aid Appropriations Act, ch. 621, 63 Stat. 709
(1949).
66. 141 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
67. Id. at 226.
68. Supra note 52.
69. Supra note 66. The contract was made prior to September 1, 1952, the effective
date of § 145-2.
70. Babbitt v. Wides Motor Sales Corp., 17 Misc. 2d 889, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Zuback v. Moskowitz Floor Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 445, 176 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct.
1958); Lichtman v. I.P.M. Industries, 158 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
71. Supra note 53.
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relied upon Lawrence v. Miller 2 and denied all recovery to the
plaintiff. The reliance upon Lawrence, a case involving an installment
land contract, is typical. Section 145-a was not mentioned. And in
Harrisv. Emerson Sales Corp.,73 the Appellate Term refused to allow
a defaulting purchaser of windows to offset his deposit against the
claim for damages brought by the defendant supplier. Apparently the
case held that the plaintiff in default must not only pay full damages
for his breach, but must forfeit his deposit as well. No authority was
cited.
Some relief from the harsh doctrine of Lawrence v. Miller, as applied in the New York cases, is to be found in a rather specious
distinction between a deposit to insure performance and a deposit in
payment of the contract price. Restitution is allowed in the former
situation but denied in the latter. In Chaude v. Shepard,74 a tenant
who had deposited three months rent as security for faithful performance was allowed recovery of his deposit despite his breach.
Lawrence was distinguished on the ground that the tenant's payment
was not a partial performance of his covenant to pay despite the
fact that by the terms of the lease it was to be applied in payment of
the last three months rent. Thus a lessee in default may obtain some
relief where a purchaser in default would not. In sustaining a rather
shocking forfeiture, the New York Supreme Court, in Bisner v.
Mantell, 5 refused to apply this doctrine to a deposit made upon the
purchase price of furniture where the deposit was nearly fifty per cent
of the total price.
Another possible avenue of escape from the Lawrence rule by the6
New York courts is to be found in MacMurray v. City of Long Beach7
In this case the New York Court of Appeals allowed restitution of
money paid under a contract calling for installment payments of
delinquent taxes on the ground that the contract specifically provided
that the money was to be applied to reduce the lien. The city's subsequent sale of the tax lien to a third party for the full amount of the
lien was held to create such an unjust enrichment as to give rise to a
right to restitution in the defaulting plaintiff. Lawrence was distinguished, but the distinction is hard to see.
The New York courts are not alone in their reluctance to depart
from the rule of Lawrence v. Miller. In the recent Montana case of
Kovacich v. Metals Bank and Trust Co., the buyer of a house trailer
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Supra note 52.
160 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
122 N.Y. 397, 25 N.E. 58 (1890).
197 Misc. 807, 95 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1950).
292 N.Y. 286, 54 N.E.2d 828 (1944).
Supra note 53.
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under an installment contract was denied relief despite a Montana
statute expressly designed to relieve purchasers from forfeiture. The
plaintiffs had made substantial payments to defendant on an undisclosed purchase price when, due to a widespread copper strike,
they became financially unable to continue their payments. A new
agreement providing for reduced payments was entered into by the
parties, but it was held unenforceable for want of consideration,
despite the purchaser's reliance upon it and the acceptance by the
bank of some reduced payments. The bank had repossessed the
trailer when the plaintiffs brought this action seeking to recover the
amount of their payments less the reasonable rental value of the
trailer. They relied upon a Montana statute purportedly relieving
them from forfeiture "except in case of a grossly negligent, willful,
or fraudulent breach of duty."78 The Montana Supreme Court denied
relief, holding that the plaintiffs' financial inability was not sufficient
to appeal to the conscience of a court of equity. It quoted from
Lawrence and affirmed the lower court's action in sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.
Those courts which adhere to the minority position, allowing a
defaulting buyer of goods restitution of the excess of his payments
over the damage caused by his breach, base their action largely
upon the injustice of forfeiture. According to Professor Patterson,79
the leading case supporting recovery is the old Connecticut case of
Hickock v. Hoyt.0 There the plaintiff contracted to purchase wine
and paid fifty dollars on account. He later found that he could not
dispose of the wine profitably whereupon he defaulted. The seller
resold the wine at a price higher than the contract price. The court in
allowing a recovery stressed the fact that there was no express provision for forfeiture and that there was no loss to the seller. The
existence of a forfeiture clause should not be controlling, because
if it results in unjust enrichment it would seem to be a penalty. In
fact the mere presence of a liquidated damage clause equating
damages with payments made has, in some cases, been decisive in
causing the court to allow recovery on the ground that to hold
otherwise would be to condone a penalty."' Hickock was the principal
authority relied upon in the leading Connecticut case of Pierce v.
Staub, 2 an installment land contract case wherein restitution was
allowed. But even in Connecticut the decisions have not been
78. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-102 (1947).
79. Patterson, supra note 29, at 231.
80. 33 Conn. 553 (1866).
81. See Paradis v. Second Ave. Used Car Co., 61 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1952) (land contract).
82. 78 Conn. 459, 62 At. 760 (1906).
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uniform. Shortly after Pierce a purchaser in default under a contract
to purchase an automobile relied upon Pierce in defense of a suit
upon a check given in part payment. In American Automobile Co. V.
Perkins,83 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors denied the defense despite the fact that the seller was not damaged at all by the
buyer's breach. Pierce, and indirectly Hickock, were interpreted as
allowing restitution only where the seller has disabled himself from
performing by a subsequent sale or otherwise. In American Automobile Co., the plaintiff was a mere sales agent, and upon the buyer's
breach the plaintiff made no further effort to procure a car for the
buyer nor did it make any tender of one under the provisions of the
contract. But its inactivity was not construed as a rescission, which
would require restitution. However, in Remington Arms Union
Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Gaynor Mfg. Co.,m the same Connecticut
court relied heavily upon Pierce in allowing restitution to a defaulting
buyer of bullets. Upon the buyer's breach the seller made no further
effort to comply with the contract and tendered no more bullets. The
court commented upon the fact that the contract contained no forfeiture provision, and it considered the inactivity of the seller to be
a termination of the contract. The facts seem indistinguishable from
those in American Automobile Co. and the holding seems in conflict.
The implication of these cases is that restitution will be allowed
only when the seller has rescinded, and that being disabled from
further performance by a sale to a third party indicates such a
rescission. If this be true, the seller will never be able to dispose of
the subject matter of the contract without the fear that the defaulting
buyer may immediately demand restitution. Therefore, some practical means of foreclosing the right to restitution would seem to be
needed. However, in Segal v. Mooney,85 where a defaulting purchaser under a land contract sought recovery of a 500 dollars deposit
on a total price of 24,000 dollars, a Connecticut court, after distinguishing Pierce on the equities, held that the seller might retain the deposit
and that he was justified in selling to a third party in view of the
purchaser's firm refusal to perform. The net effect of the Connecticut
decisions is that restitution depends upon the general equities of
each case, an eminently equitable solution but one leading to uncertainty and one which would seem to invite litigation.
In Stewart v. Moss,8 6 the Supreme Court of Washington allowed restitution to a defaulting buyer of a truck and trailer. The court even
went so far as to return the purchaser his deposit of 500 dollars, which
83.
84.
85.
86.

83 Conn. 520, 77 At. 954 (1910).
98 Conn. 721, 120 At. 572 (1923).
15 Conn. Supp. 41 (C.P. 1947).
30 Wash. 2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948).
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the contract denominated liquidated damage, upon the defendant's
failure to prove actual damages. The equities in this case were strongly
with the plaintiff. The defendant had it within his power to assist the
purchaser in financing his payments, but chose not to do so, preferring
to keep the truck and trailer and forfeit the plaintiff's payments. Nonetheless, it would seem that the modest deposit of 500 dollars was probably a valid estimate of liquidated damage and that its retention
should have been allowed. In placing the burden of proving damage
caused by plaintiff's breach upon the defendant, Stewart goes even
further than do the courts of California, a state notably partial to defaulting purchasers. In California, and in most other states where
restitution is available, the plaintiff is entitled only to the excess of
his payments over the damage caused by his breach, and the burden of
establishing this amount requires him to prove the amount of
damage. 7
The factors that control the defaulting buyer's right to restitution
are many. Even in a jurisdiction such as New York which adheres
strictly to the majority view, restitution is possible if the sum sought
to be recovered can be considered a "deposit" rather than a partial per-formance.8 And although statutes such as New York Personal Property Law section 145-a and the Uniform Commercial Code section 2718(2) have made only rare appearances in the courts, their impact
on day-to-day unlitigated transactions may well be considerable. The
nature of the buyer's breach may be decisive. If it be deemed a "willful" breach his equitable position is weakened. Unfortunately "willful"
is a vague term.8 9 Financial inability to complete the contract was
treated as a willful breach in KovacichW and forfeiture of the purchaser's payments was allowed despite a statute purporting to relieve
defaulting buyers from forfeiture. And yet Stewart v. Moss9' found
that the plaintiff's breach was not willful because his financial ability
was "the result of circumstances over which the defaulting party has
no control."92 The attitude of the defendant seller in insisting upon
the letter of the law in Stewart made him appear unduly grasping and
was the principal factor in causing the court to award the plaintiff
restitution. On the other hand, where the payment is small in proportion to the total price and intended as earnest money, restitution will
87. Raffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal. 2d 36, 216 P.2d 13 (1950); Lines v. Marin Municipal
Water Dist., 228 Cal. App. 2d 155, 39 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
88. Chaude v. Shepherd, supra note 74.
89. See 5A CoaRnN, CoNTRAcrs § 1123 (1964).
90. Supra note 53.
91. 30 Wash. 2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948).
92. Id. at 542, 192 P.2d at 366.
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usually be denied. 93 Even in jurisdictions which have ruled out unjust
enrichment as a basis for restitution, the equities do play a part, as
witness MacMurray v. City of Long Beach.4 Some courts have been

influenced by the lack of a forfeiture clause in the contract, 95 although
the mere existence of such a clause is no assurance that restitution will
be denied. 96 Where the effect of a forfeiture clause is to create an obvious penalty, even a court which follows the majority rule may allow
restitution.9 7 If the defendant seller is still ready and willing to perform, restitution may well be denied, however, even in a jurisdiction
adhering to the minority position. 98 But if the seller has "rescinded"
or made it impossible for himself to perform, restitution may be required.99 Nevertheless, resale to a third party may not indicate rescission if the buyer's default is unequivocal and final.100 The net effect of
these various factors is to leave restitution uncertain, with the equities
being given more weight in the minority jurisdictions but being considered to some degree even in those states most firmly committed to
the majority rule. In sales of goods the security element is not great
except in those cases where possession is given to the buyer. There the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act' 01 and the Uniform Commercial Code'02
both recognize the security element and provide for an equitable statutory solution to the problems of both parties.
IV.

PLAINTIFF IN DEFAULT UNDER A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF LAND

In this area, at least in the case of the installment land contract, the
seller uses his retained title primarily as security for the payment of
the purchase price. No uniform act controls here. The results are
generally equitable; but their lack of certainty mitigates against the

use of the installment land contract. Although some state statutes have
been enacted' 03 and others have been proposed, 104 legislatures generally have been reluctant in devising predictable procedures to deal
with breach of land contracts.
93. E.g., Segal v. Mooney, supra note 85; Silverstein v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n,

17 App. Div. 2d 160, 232 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
94. Supra note 76.
95. E.g., Pierce v. Staub, supra note 82.
96. E.g., Stewart v. Moss, supra note 86.
97. E.g., Paradis v. Second Ave. Used Car Co., supra note 81.
98. E.g., American Automobile Co. v. Perkins, supra note 83; Biddle v. Biddle, 202
Mich. 160, 168 N.W. 92 (1918).
99. E.g., Parchen v. Rowley, 196 Wash. 340, 82 P.2d 857 (1938).
100. E.g., Segal v. Mooney, supra note 85; Reitano v. Fote, 50 So. 2d 873 (Fla.
1951).
101. UNwoRM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT §§ 16-26.
102. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-501-9-507.
103. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 110-116 (1957).
104. See 1937 N.Y. LAw REvIsION CoMM'N REP. 343.
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The overwhelming weight of authority denies restitution to the purchaser in default under a contract for the sale of land.105 However, the
general rule is applied with such variation and modification among the
various jurisdictions that it is possible to classify some courts as being
rigid adherents to the general rule. Others, although not altogether
rejecting the general rule, have so diluted it that it is hardly recognizable. At the opposite ends of the spectrum are New York and California. Between them lie the rest of the states, administering equity
according to the views of their several courts, affirming the rule while
making exceptions to it, or denying the rule as they apply it. When it
is realized that probably the majority of the cases involve installment
land contracts in which the vendor's retained title is used as security
for the payment of the purchase price, it can be seen that here, the
lack of predictable certainty presents a serious problem.
Lawrence v. Miller 1 is the leading New York case embodying the
strict rule permitting the vendor to forfeit payments made by a purchaser in default. The defaulting plaintiff, in that case, argued that
the vendor should be permitted to retain only that portion of the
2,000 dollars payment which represented his actual damage. There
had been no proof of actual damage caused by the plaintiff's breach
and the court intimated that it could deny restitution on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to show that the damage was less than the
amount of the deposit. But it was not content to rest there. It went
further and declared, "that it is never permitted either at law or in
equity, for one to recover back money paid on an executory contract
that he had refused or neglected to perform." 1'1
California which at one time adhered to the general rule as strictly
as does New York'018 has, since 1951, so modified it that the state must
now be recognized as being firmly opposed to forfeiture. In Freedman
v. The Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen,1 9 the Supreme Court of California allowed restitution to a willful defaulter on the theory that otherwise the effect would be to impose punitive damages for breach of
contract in violation of statute." 0 However, the California court was
careful not to overrule its previous decision in Glock v. Howard &
105. See, e.g., Melton v. Amar, 86 Idaho 262, 385 P.2d 406 (1963); Graves v. Winer,
351 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961); Macon v. Zeiler, 233 Md. 160, 195 A.2d 687
(1963); La Vallee v. Cataldo, 343 Mass. 332, 178 N.E.2d 484 (1961); Notti v. Clark,
133 Mont. 263, 322 P.2d 112 (1958); Davies v. Boyd, 73 N.M. 85, 385 P.2d 950
(1963); Diehl v. Welsh, 393 P.2d 834 (Okla. 1964); Pappas v. Lucas, 181 Pa. Super.
194, 124 A.2d 161 (1956); Weyher v. Peterson, 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965).
106. 86 N.Y. 131 (1881).
107. Id. at 139-40.
108. Glock v. Howard &Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898).
109. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
110. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294.
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Wilson Colony Co."' which was a blunt statement of the majority
rule. The court distinguished Glock and the other California decisions
allowing forfeiture on the ground that the vendee in each case was
probably unable to prove that the vendor's retention of both land and
payments would result in the imposition of punitive damages." 2 Nonetheless, the result of Freedman has been to reject forfeiture; a further
result has been to destroy the utility of the installment land contract
in California." 3 Without forfeiture the installment land contract is no
more advantageous to the vendor than a mortgage.
Other states while generally adopting the language of the majority
view, have managed to apply equity as they see it, leading to confusion
and a loss of the predictable certainty which the installment land contract, as a security device, would seem to require.
A. Retention of EarnestMoney

One might think that when the sole payment made by the defaulting
purchaser is a deposit made as earnest money, to be forfeited if he
breaches, restitution would be uniformly denied. If the payment were
but a small percentage of the total price, it would appear justifiable to
allow its retention as liquidated damage if nothing else." 4 But California has ruled out the liquidated damage theory on the ground that
subsequent proof of actual damage establishes that it is not "impractical or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage"" 5 and hence where
actual proof is available, damages cannot be liquidated." 6 Such reasoning defers determination of the validity of a liquidated damage
clause until after the breach and thus destroys its principal reason for
existence. According to Freedman, whenever actual damage can be
shown to be less than the liquidated figure, retention of the latter
should be denied as a penalty.
California purports to place the burden of proving actual damage
upon the plaintiff in default." 7 But in Freedman the court made the
finding solely on the basis that the vendor resold for 2,000 dollars more
111. Supra note 108.
112. See also Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).

For a detailed

discussion of the California cases see Howe, Forfeituresin Land Contracts,in 1953-1954
CUmENT TAENDs N STATE LEcISLATION 417, 457-65 (1955); see also Lee, Defaulting
Purchaser'sRight to Restitution under the Installment Land Contract, 20 U. Mr. iv L.

REv. 1 (1965).
113. Hetland, Land Contracts, CaiFoNu-A LAND SEcUrITY AND DEVELOPMENT

§

2.20, at 61 (1960).
114. See Macon v. Zeiler, supranote 105.
115. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1671.

116. Freedman v. The Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen, supra note 109, at 23, 230
P.2d at 633.
117. Baffa v. Johnson, supra note 87; Lines v. Matin Municipal. Water Dist., supra
note 87.
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than the original contract piece and showed only a 900 dollar broker's
fee as an offset to the profit. It would seem that other factors might
affect the actual damage, for instance, taxes and maintenance pending
the second sale, and that the plaintiff should have been required to
prove them. The court, however, apparently felt that the second sale
at an increased price indicated an obvious lack of damage. Although
Connecticut is not so adamantly opposed to forfeiture as is California,
Pierce v. Staub"8 placed the burden of proving actual damage on the
vendor; and when no damage was proved, it allowed the defaulting
purchaser full recovery. To this extent Connecticut would appear more
lenient to the defaulting purchaser even than California, but in Segal
v. Mooney,"9 a Connecticut court allowed forfeiture of a 500 dollar
deposit on a purchase price of 24,000 dollars without any proof of
actual damage and distinguished Pierce on the equities.
Maryland, in two recent cases has refused to allow a defaulting purchaser recovery of payments amounting to less than ten per cent of the
purchase price without any showing of actual damage. In Quillan v.
Kelly, 120 the payment was 22,500 dollars on a total price of 257,500

dollars, and in Macon v. Zeiler,'2' the payment was 1,000 dollars on a
price of 20,000 dollars. In Macon, the court found the payment to be
liquidated damage although the contract merely referred to it as a
deposit. In Graves v. Winer'2 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky recently refused to compel a return of a ten per cent deposit even though
it found that there was no damage caused by the purchaser's breach.
It would appear that in most jurisdictions a payment of ten per cent
of the purchase price or less can be retained by the vendor without
proof of actual damage. But in California, at least, proof of actual
damage less than the deposit entitles the defaulting plaintiff to restitution of the excess.
B. Rescission
Perhaps the most common ploy adopted to achieve equity within the
confines of the majority rule is to find a rescission. Certainly if both
parties agree to the rescission, a restoration of the status quo ante is
called for. But if such is the case there will usually be no argument by
the vendor. The more common situation is that the vendor has inadvertently done some act inconsistent with his purported intent to perform
which is seized upon by the court as evidence of rescission. In Pierce
v. Staub'2 it was the vendor's subsequent resale which was held to
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Supra note 82.
Supra note 85. Cf. Stewart v. Moss, supra note 86.
216 Md. 396, 140 A.2d 517 (1958).
Supra note 105.
Supra note 105.
Supra note 82.
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establish a rescission although it took place long after the purchaser's
default. In that case, the loss of 60,000 dollars by the purchaser's
widow was just too much for the court to approve. Rescission was an
acceptable way to reach an equitable result without disturbing the
majority rule. 12 In Segal v. Mooney,12 the Connecticut court admitted
that Pierce's finding of a rescission was a fiction for adjusting the
equities and refused to find rescission despite a later sale, distinguishing Pierce solely on the equities.
Even the most liberal of courts would be hard pressed to allow restitution against a vendor who not only was not in default but also was
actively seeking specific performance. 126 But must the vendor always
stand ready to perform? Can he never consider the first contract at an
end and seek to find a new purchaser without running the risk that a
court may hold that he has rescinded? The danger of the vendor's
position is well illustrated by the Kentucky case of Guill v. Pugh.12
There a defaulting purchaser was allowed restitution of a 500 dollar
down payment on a purchase price of 9,500 dollars because the subsequent sale of the property to a third party for 9,650 dollars was
deemed a rescission. 12 8 It will be recalled that, in the later case of
Graves v. Winer, 12 the same Kentucky court refused to allow restitution despite the fact that no damage was caused by the breach. The
result in Graves is attributable to the skill of the vendor's lawyer who
had the foresight to sue for specific performance and damages even
though his client had suffered no damage. This affirmative posture of
the vendor made it impossible to find a rescission and thus the counterclaim for restitution failed. Presumably as soon as the decision in
Graves was final the vendor could sell to a new purchaser secure in
the knowledge that his right to the deposit was res judicata.
Although usually used to permit the defaulting purchaser to recover
his payments, rescission is not a "one way street." It requires a return
to the status quo ante for both parties. The recent Oregon case of
Johnston v. Gilbert130 illustrates the point. There the purchasers were
clearly in default under an installment land contract. The vendor
brought suit in equity to declare the rights of the purchasers forfeited.
The trial court, holding that the vendor was in the wrong forum and
that equity will never declare a forfeiture, 131 sustained a demurrer to
124. Compare Taylor v. Rawlins, 86 Fla. 279, 97 So. 714 (1923).
125. Supra note 85.
126. See Power v. North, 15 S. & R. 12 (Pa. 1826).
127. 311 Ky. 90, 223 S.W.2d 574 (1949).
128. Compare Frazier v. Ruskin, 203 Pa. Super. 525, 199 A.2d 513 (1964).
129. Supra note 105.
130. 234 Ore. 350, 382 P.2d 87 (1963).
131. Equity, however, frequently confirms a forfeiture by quieting title in the vendor
without requiring restitution. See Pierce & Stevenson v. Jones, 109 Fla. 517, 147 So. 842
(1933); Mintle v. Sylvester, 202 Iowa 1128, 211 N.W. 367 (1926).
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the bill. The purchasers, however, welcomed the vendor's action as an
offer to rescind and acquiesced in it to the extent that they were willing to forfeit the payments made and be relieved of any further obligation. The trial court held that the vendor's suit was a repudiation of
the contract and decreed that the vendor retain the payments made.
The vendor appealed and was successful in establishing his right not
only to retain the payments, but to recover the difference between the
payments and the rental value of the premises if it should be found that
such rental value exceeded the payments. The court stated, "the concomitant of rescission is restitution, not forfeiture." 132 In this case the
vendor's recovery would include the benefit he had conferred set off by
the benefit received.33
C. Retention of Payments Not Unjust
Malmberg v. Baugh' 4 is one of the leading cases allowing restitution
to the purchaser in default. It was a case of first impression in Utah
and in its opinion the Supreme Court of Utah made a point of castigating the majority rule as unconscionable. Malmberg was quoted and
13
heavily relied upon by the California Supreme Court in Freedman. 1
It is a decision which would seem to place Utah among those jurisdictions most favorable to the defaulting purchaser. But the subsequent
Utah cases indicate no such thing. Malmberg is still good law, but its
holding rests upon the unjust enrichment of the vendor. Recent cases
have merely found that the vendor's retention of the purchaser's payments is not "unjust." The effect is to allow forfeitures which seem
indistinguishable from those allowed in New York.
Weyher v. Peterson,"36 a 1965 Utah case, was a forcible entry action
brought by the vendor against a defaulting purchaser. The purchaser
counterclaimed for restitution of the value of his equity in the property.
The court allowed a forfeiture despite the fact that the purchaser had
paid 9,387 dollars under the contract and had spent 3,078 dollars in
improvements. The stipulated rental value of the premises was 8,950
dollars. The court found that the vendor had paid 700 dollars for repairs and 855 dollars for a commission in selling to a new purchaser.
It deliberately disregarded the value of the purchaser's improvements
stating, "the contract and law require him to sacrifice them in the event
of his failure to meet his known duties under the contract." 1 7 To
132. 234 Ore. at 354, 382 P.2d at 89.

133. Cf. Cohen v. Kranz, 15 App. Div. 2d 938, 226 N.Y.S.2d 509 (2d Dep't 1962);
Rubin v. Pugatch, 19 Misc. 2d 885, 191 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
134. 62 Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 (1923).

135. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 20-21, 230 P.2d 629, 632 (1951).
136. 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965). Accord, Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d
272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958); Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401 (1942).
137. 16 Utah 2d at 280, 399 P.2d at 439.
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similar effect is another recent Utah case, Strand v. Mayne,138 where
the purchaser had paid 19,262 dollars on a purchase price of 41,500
dollars and had spent an additional 9,500 dollars in repairs. The Utah
court found nothing inequitable in denying restitution, because the
purchaser had "resold" the property and received 15,615 dollars from
the new purchaser, which, when added to the rental value of the property (14,850 dollars) more than equalled the purchaser's outlay. The
plaintiff's purchaser also defaulted on his contract and forfeited his
payments to the plaintiff. The result was that the vendor recovered his
property and was permitted to retain benefits in excess of any loss to
him. To denominate the vendor's retention of payments as "just" because the purchaser was able to pass the loss on to a third party leaves
open a wide door for forfeiture and indicates an affinity for the majority
rule. It also indicates a confusion of benefits conferred with injuries
sustained. Negligibility of the latter need not affect recovery of the
139
former.
Idaho likewise, in two recent cases, justifies its adherence to the
majority rule by finding that the retention of the defaulting purchaser's
payments is not unjust. In Miller v. Remior,140 the Idaho Supreme
Court had before it a typical installment land contract, equating payments made with liquidated damages, making time of the essence and
providing for forfeiture. The vendor, upon the purchaser's breach, was
allowed to retain a house valued at 10,000 dollars given in part payment on a purhcase price of 29,844.25 dollars. The court found that
the house and one payment of 578.76 dollars was sufficiently proportionate to the rental value of the ranch to constitute a valid liquidated
damage. This is a good example of allowing later facts to validate a
damage clause that was clearly invalid when drawn. Also, the rental
value of the ranch was estimated at 7,600 dollars and the purchaser
was held to account for that, but the rental value of the house which
the purchaser contributed as part payment was not deemed a benefit
to the vendor for which he need account. Freedman and Malmberg
were quoted at some length and apparently the court felt that their
facts warranted their distinction without comment. And in a later case,
Melton v. Amar,141 the same court, when called upon to determine
whether forfeiture of all payments was a valid liquidated damage or
an invalid penalty, applied similar reasoning to an even less justifiable
result. The forfeiture of the purchaser's payment of 31,712 dollars was
justified on equitable grounds because the purchaser had received total
138. 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963).
139. See Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929); Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v.
United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 Fed. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
140. 86 Idaho 121, 383 P.2d 596 (1963). But see Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho
485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962).
141. Supra note 105.
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benefits under the contract amounting to 22,785 dollars. This left
nearly 9,000 dollars to the vendor as a windfall but the result was not
considered inequitable.
Many installment land contracts contain a forfeiture clause similar
to that in the Idaho cases just discussed, a clause purporting to forfeit
all payments made by the purchaser as liquidated damages in the event
of his breach. Some courts, concluding that this forfeiture provision
constituted a penalty, have held it invalid and thus allowed restitution. For instance, the Florida Supreme Court in Paradis v. Second
Avenue Used Car Co. 142 allowed restitution of a 4,000 dollars deposit

on the ground that the clause bore no relationship to actual damage
and hence to allow retention would be to condone an illegal penalty.
The burden of proving damage was placed upon the vendor. However, the same court has adopted the position that, even in the ab143
sence of a forfeiture clause, the purchaser in default cannot recover.
In at least two recent cases the vendor benefited by having the forfeiture clause treated as a penalty rather than as liquidated damage.
In Ashurst v. Rosser,144 the vendor brought suit against the defaulting
purchaser for damages. The contract provided that in the event of
breach by the purchaser the vendor might retain all payments as rent.
The defendants asserted that this was the limit of their liability, but the
court said, "the amount so paid was in the nature of a penalty and not
liquidated damages." 145 The vendor was thus awarded further
146
damages over and above the retained payment. In Cohen v. Kranz,
the defaulting purchaser brought suit to recover his deposit of 4,500
dollars. The court found that the vendor's total damage was 6,000
dollars and after denying relief to the purchaser awarded the vendor
1,500 dollars on his counterclaim. It thus appears that although the
majority rule refuses to take actual damage into account in determining the purchaser's right to restitution, it treats actual damage as relevant if the suit is by the vendor.
V. CoNcLusIoN

Perhaps the most interesting thing about the majority rule denying
restitution is its persistence in the face of continuing criticism. 141 As
142. Supra note 97. Accord, Pembroke v. Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 37 So. 2d 538 (1948).
143. Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1950). Compare De Leon v. Aldrete, 398
S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
144. 275 Ala. 163, 153 So. 2d 240 (1963).
145. Id. at 168, 153 So. 2d at 245.
146. Supra note 133. The persistence of defaulting plaintiffs in New York is remarkable in the light of the treatment they receive.
147. See, e.g., 5A ConnIN, CoNRAc-rs §§ 1122-35 (1964); Corbin, The Right of a
Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931);
Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: II, 44
YALE L.J. 754 (1935).
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long ago as 1937, the New York Law Revision Commission sponsored
legislation to change the rule in that state. 148 It was not enacted. Similar legislation to prevent forfeiture in contracts for the sale of personalty was enacted only after ten years of waiting.149 And even then the
courts were reluctant to make use of the statute. Maryland has a
statute designed to prevent forfeiture in real estate sales where the
price is less than 15,000 dollars. 150 But it has not affected the general
rule in that state. 151 The Uniform Commercial Code' 52 indicates a disapproval of forfeiture which might be expected to carry over to the
land contract area, but no such trend is visible. Jurisdictions such as
California, Connecticut and Utah, which, in particular cases have
strongly disapproved of forfeiture, have tended to retreat from these
liberal positions.
It has been suggested that the failure of American courts to develop
an equitable procedure similar to mortgage foreclosure to deal with the
installment land contract is the result of preoccupation with freedom
of contract. 1 3 Others have questioned whether equity may be decadent. 5 4 It may be that, despite the potential for abuse inherent in the
majority rule, ameliorating devices such as fictitious rescission or, on
occasion, frank recognition of equity when forfeiture would shock the
conscience of the court, have managed to keep abuse to such a minimum that the rule evokes no general outcry. Inconsistency may be
preferable to risk of undermining the sanctity of contract. Of course
restitution would not affect the contract at all. But it is understandable
that a court familiar with defaulters in their role as defendants might
view restitution as somehow condoning sin. It is not surprising that the
subject of restitution evokes but little response from the legislatures.
Its political appeal is negligible. Legislation regulating installment
sales is common. 55 But its primary purpose is to prevent fraud. The
need of the real estate community for an economical, swift and yet
just means of foreclosing the right of restitution arising from the installment land contract has not yet been recognized. But, all things
considered, this is not an area which cries out for reform. The potential
injustice of the general rule affects no organized group - and in most
jurisdictions the injustice is potential only.
148. 1937 N.Y. LAW REmISON Comm'N REP. 349.

149. N.Y. PEns. PROP. LAw § 145-a, enacted 1952, was first proposed in different
form in 1942, 1942 N.Y. LA-w REVISION COm 'N REP. 179.
150. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 110-16 (1957).
151. Quillen v. Kelley, supra note 120; Great United Realty Co. v. Lewis, 203 Md.

442, 101 A.2d 881 (1954). See 19 MD. L. REV. 51 (1959).
152. UNIFORM CoixmciAL CODE §§ 2-718, 9-501-07.
153. Simpson, supra note 147, at 756.
154. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MIN. L. Rv. 479 (1938).
155. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 478.011-211 (1965); N.Y. PEns. PROP. LAW §§ 401-19.

